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Apache HTTP Server HTTP/2 Bomb: Affected Versions and the 2.4.68 Fix

A flaw called the 'HTTP/2 Bomb' (CVE-2026-49975) lets even a single home PC take Apache and other major web servers offline in seconds. OpenAI's AI 'Codex' found it before humans did, a proof-of-concept is public, and Shodan shows 880,000+ servers exposed. Apache fixed it in 2.4.68, released June 8. Here are the affected versions and what to update now.

NewsPublished June 9, 2026 Updated today
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Key takeaways

A flaw called the 'HTTP/2 Bomb' (CVE-2026-49975) lets even a single home PC take Apache and other major web servers offline in seconds. OpenAI's AI 'Codex' found it before humans did, a proof-of-concept is public, and Shodan shows 880,000+ servers exposed. Apache fixed it in 2.4.68, released June 8. Here are the affected versions and what to update now.

Apache HTTP Server, one of the most widely used web servers in the world, has a flaw (a security defect) in versions 2.4.17 through 2.4.67 that lets a single ordinary home computer knock the server offline in just seconds. Named the "HTTP/2 Bomb," it is tracked as CVE-2026-49975 and was fixed in version 2.4.68, released on June 8, 2026 and still the latest release as of July 23, 2026. If you run 2.4.68 or later, no action is needed for this flaw; anything older needs an update. In Japan, JPCERT/CC issued an advisory via the JVN vulnerability portal (JVNVU#99913823).

What surprised people most was how it was found. The flaw was spotted not by a human researcher but by OpenAI's AI "Codex," which connected two techniques that had been known for over a decade. A proof-of-concept (PoC) is public, and at disclosure the discoverers reported that over 880,000 servers were exposed on the internet. The impact is not limited to Apache: it spans the major web servers that use HTTP/2 β€” nginx, Microsoft IIS, Envoy, and more.

Note that this is not a data-theft flaw β€” it is the kind of attack that takes a service down.

Which versions are affected, and how to update

On Apache HTTP Server, all versions from 2.4.17 through 2.4.67 β€” which include the HTTP/2 component (mod_http2) β€” are affected by the HTTP/2 Bomb, and updating to 2.4.68 closes it. That 2.4.68 release also bundles fixes for a total of 13 vulnerabilities, including the HTTP/2 Bomb (CVE-2026-49975). You can check your version by running httpd -v or apache2 -v on the server. As of July 23, 2026, 2.4.68 is still the latest release, with no newer fix release and no new Apache httpd vulnerability reported since.

Your versionStatusWhat to do
2.4.68 or laterFixedNo action needed
2.4.17 – 2.4.67Affected
(if HTTP/2 on)
Update to
2.4.68
2.4.16 or earlierNot directly
affected here
(but many others)
Move to a
supported version

Most organizations and individuals run Apache through the packages shipped by their OS (a Linux distribution such as Ubuntu, Debian, or RHEL). In that case, the distribution releases an update that incorporates the fix, so a normal update via apt or dnf applies it. If you cannot update right away, temporary mitigations (such as disabling HTTP/2) are covered below. If you are not using HTTP/2 at all, the HTTP/2 Bomb itself does not affect you.

What happens: one home PC silences a large server in seconds

HTTP/2 is a newer communication protocol, standardized in 2015 to make web pages load faster, and it is now used by a large share of sites. The HTTP/2 Bomb abuses two mechanisms built into it to exhaust the server's memory all at once and drive it into an unresponsive state. It is not data theft or takeover (code execution); it is a denial-of-service (DoS) that stops the service itself. The technical category is "memory allocation with an excessive size value" (CWE-789).

The frightening part is the efficiency. According to Calif.io's write-up, a home computer on an ordinary 100 Mbps connection can render a vulnerable server inaccessible within seconds. The attacker sends only a trickle of data, yet on the server side each byte balloons into up to thousands of bytes of memory β€” a single connection can be made to consume 32 GB in 10 to 45 seconds in the researchers' tests. The attack requires no login (no authentication), so any server reachable over HTTP/2 from the outside can be a target.

The mechanism combines two classic, long-known tricks. The first abuses "HPACK" header compression: seed one large header into the server's temporary table, then send a one-byte "use that header again" instruction thousands of times, and the server expands each one into large data. The second abuses "flow control," which paces data: the attacker tells the server it "can't receive any more," deliberately preventing the response from completing and keeping the memory pinned. Stack the two and a tiny amount of traffic holds huge amounts of memory for a long time, until the server gives out.

Who wants this bug, and what do they walk off with

"If no data is stolen, how bad can it be?" you might think. But what this flaw strikes is not information β€” it is the simple fact that your site or service is up and running. The ease of taking down a major server with a single cheap connection looks deeply attractive to certain people. The ones who go after it are repeat DoS-extortion crews who hold a site hostage for money, rival operators who want to knock out a competitor's sales or bookings at peak hours, hacktivists who want to silence a target site to make a point, and intruders who want to briefly take down monitoring and service to distract from a real break-in or data theft. What they take is not the contents but the hours your users could have reached you. The moment an HTTP/2 Bomb request is sent in, your site can be quietly knocked out at exactly the busiest hour of the day.

The damage does not end at one downed box. An online store takes no orders, a booking site stops accepting reservations, a business system stalls work inside and outside the company at once. More troubling is the pattern where the outage is used as a "diversion" β€” staged while operators' hands and attention are consumed by recovery, so the attacker can push the real ransomware or intrusion. During the tens of minutes a server is down and monitoring is thin, a serious attack can advance through another entrance β€” and that does happen in the real world.

And the loss from the downed service, plus the cleanup, lands on the operator and IT team that run the site. They shoulder the lost revenue, apologies and support inquiries, root-cause analysis and recovery, broken service-level promises (SLAs) with partners, and the accountability of "why was the update put off." Apache's severity label here is not the top tier but "Moderate." Yet when the conditions line up β€” cheap to launch, no authentication, and a public proof-of-concept β€” a low label is no reason to wait. Whether the fix has been applied decides whether you end up on the receiving end.

Why an AI found it before humans did

What caught the technical world's attention was less the flaw than the fact that an AI found it. The two tricks behind the discovery β€” abusing header compression and stalling the response via flow control β€” had each been individually known for more than a decade. What OpenAI's coding assistant "Codex" saw was the single point that combining the two yields an outsized destructive effect. The discoverers reflected that "the combination is obvious once you see it, and yet as far as we can tell no human had put it together."

This is less a case of AI inventing unknown theory from scratch than of quickly connecting known parts that humans had overlooked, drawing on a vast base of prior work. Still, the implication is not small. Vulnerability discovery may change sharply in speed and volume with AI, and if attackers use it, overlooked combinations of old mechanisms could be weaponized one after another. The AI arms race is accelerating on both offense and defense. This time AI worked for the defenders (finding and fixing), but it is also a warning that the reverse is entirely possible.

Not just Apache: where the major web servers stand

The HTTP/2 Bomb is less a bug in one product than a weakness lurking in implementations of the HTTP/2 protocol itself. So it cut across the major web servers, and each product responded on its own timeline after coordinated disclosure. The table sums up the status as of July 23, 2026.

ProductRoleStatus
Apache HTTP
Server
Web serverFixed in 2.4.68
(June 8)
nginxWeb serverFixed in 1.29.8
(new max_headers)
EnvoyProxyPatched
June 3
Microsoft IISWeb serverInvestigating at
disclosure; fix not
yet confirmed
Cloudflare
Pingora
ProxyProtected by existing
defenses; no patch
needed

In other words, "just fix Apache and you're done" does not hold. You need to inventory what you run at the front of your stack β€” nginx, a reverse proxy, a load balancer, or a cloud edge β€” and check each one's latest guidance. Apache accounts for over a fifth of the world's web servers, and HTTP/2 is used as a de facto standard, so affected configurations are far from rare.

The other 12 fixes in Apache 2.4.68: CVE-2026-44119, CVE-2026-44185 and more

Beyond the HTTP/2 Bomb, Apache 2.4.68 bundles 12 more vulnerabilities, all rated Moderate or Low by Apache, with nothing that lets a server be taken over. Whether they apply depends on the features you run.

CVE-2026-44119: a shared-hosting tenant can read other users' files

The most notable for shared-hosting customers is CVE-2026-44119, a privilege-escalation flaw in Apache's expression evaluation across several modules. Someone able to write a crafted per-site config file (.htaccess) could read files belonging to another tenant that should be invisible to them, with the privileges of the httpd user. It affects 2.4.0–2.4.67 and matters most where one server is shared by many users. It was reported by 10 independent researchers.

CVE-2026-44185: an information leak in SSL certificate checking (mod_ssl)

CVE-2026-44185 is a low-severity stack buffer over-read in mod_ssl's OCSP request handling, reachable via an attacker-controlled OCSP server during outbound certificate validation. The practical impact is a limited information leak rather than takeover, but it applies if your setup performs OCSP checks on outbound TLS connections.

CVE-2026-34355: memory corruption in the reverse-proxy (mod_proxy) path

CVE-2026-34355 is memory corruption that can occur when the reverse-proxy features (the mod_proxy family) process a malicious backend response. It applies only to configurations that use Apache as a reverse proxy.

The full list of all 13 is on Apache's official vulnerability page. Even without time to triage each one, updating to 2.4.68 closes all 13. Rather than dissecting your configuration in detail, moving to the latest version is the reliable move.

From disclosure to fix

Because the HTTP/2 Bomb spans multiple web servers, it was disclosed in stages as each product readied its response. The Apache-side fix arrived in full as Apache HTTP Server 2.4.68 on June 8.

← swipe to move

How to read the current risk

βœ“ Confirmed facts

  • βœ“The HTTP/2 Bomb (CVE-2026-49975) is an unauthenticated, remote denial-of-service; Apache 2.4.17–2.4.67 are affected, 2.4.68 fixes it, and 2.4.68 is still the latest release as of July 23, 2026 (Apache / NVD)
  • βœ“A proof-of-concept is public; the discoverers reported 880,000+ exposed servers via Shodan at disclosure (Calif.io)
  • βœ“CISA's analysis team (CISA-ADP) and Red Hat rate the severity 7.5 out of 10 ("High"); Apache's own label is Moderate (NVD)
  • βœ“nginx and Envoy are fixed; Cloudflare Pingora says its existing defenses block the attack with no patch needed

? Not yet confirmed

  • ?Real-world exploitation β€” about two months after disclosure, as of July 23, 2026, no broad abuse has been reported, and it is not listed in the U.S. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog
  • ?A Microsoft IIS fix β€” IIS was "investigating" at disclosure, and no fix release has been confirmed since

Soberly, what happens is "service downtime," not data theft or takeover, and broad exploitation has not been confirmed. On the other hand, the conditions β€” unauthenticated, cheap to launch, with a public PoC, and 880,000+ servers reported exposed β€” mean the bar to attack is very low. Security vendors such as FortiGuard continue to urge patching. Applying the fix before abuse begins is the cheapest, most reliable choice.

What to do now

If you run a web server, the work is mostly updating.

  • Check your Apache version (httpd -v / apache2 -v); if it is earlier than 2.4.68, treat it as affected
  • For OS-shipped Apache, update via apt / dnf; confirm your distribution has incorporated the fix
  • If you cannot update immediately, consider temporary mitigations: disable HTTP/2 if it is not needed, or limit headers and memory per connection
  • Inventory the software you run at the front of the stack β€” nginx, reverse proxies, load balancers, cloud edges β€” and check each one's latest guidance
  • Watch for sudden memory spikes and response delays; strengthen logging and resource monitoring for signs of rapid memory exhaustion

Give priority to web servers that face the internet directly and to public sites with HTTP/2 enabled. Because the attack succeeds simply by sending crafted traffic to a reachable HTTP/2 endpoint, leaving it exposed raises the risk. If you run multiple servers, inventory them and roll out the update together.

FAQ

Q. Can data be stolen through this flaw?

No. The HTTP/2 Bomb (CVE-2026-49975) is a denial-of-service (DoS) that makes a server unresponsive; it does not steal information or execute code. That said, the outage itself causes lost revenue and work, and it can be used as a diversion for another attack.

Q. Am I safe if I don't use HTTP/2?

The HTTP/2 Bomb's direct trigger is in HTTP/2 processing, so disabling HTTP/2 avoids this specific flaw. But Apache 2.4.68 also fixes 12 other vulnerabilities, so updating to the latest version is recommended either way.

Q. Does "an AI found it" mean an AI attacked?

No. Security researchers used OpenAI's Codex and realized that combining two known tricks becomes dangerous β€” a defensive discovery. The AI did not autonomously attack servers. Still, the same approach could be used by attackers, so the trend bears watching.

Q. Is fixing Apache enough?

No. The HTTP/2 Bomb spans multiple products, including nginx and proxies. Beyond the web server itself, check the fix status of reverse proxies, load balancers, and cloud edge software you use.

Summary

The "HTTP/2 Bomb" (CVE-2026-49975) is a denial-of-service flaw in Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.17 through 2.4.67 that lets even a single home computer on a cheap connection drive a server into unresponsiveness within seconds. It is not data theft or takeover, but it is unauthenticated, needs little traffic, and ships with a public proof-of-concept; at disclosure the discoverers reported 880,000+ servers exposed on the internet. Apache fixed it β€” along with 12 other flaws, 13 in total β€” in version 2.4.68, released on June 8, 2026 and still the latest release as of July 23, 2026.

The case also drew attention because an AI, not a human, first realized that combining two decade-old tricks turns dangerous β€” a sign that vulnerability discovery is entering an era of greater speed and volume. About two months after disclosure, no broad exploitation has been confirmed, but the proof-of-concept remains public. If you run a web server, check your version, update anything older than 2.4.68, and review front-of-stack software such as nginx and proxies too. On 2.4.68 or later, nothing more is needed for this flaw.

Sources

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Makoto Horikawa

Backend Engineer / AWS / Django