Is Your Mitsubishi Wi-Fi Air Conditioner Safe? Hard-coded Password Flaw (CVE-2026-5667)
Mitsubishi Electric disclosed that many Wi-Fi-enabled home appliances—air conditioners, refrigerators, water heaters, IH cooktops, rice cookers and more—shipped with a hard-coded password (CVE-2026-5667). Appliances left with Wi-Fi on but never connected to a home router can let a nearby third party read operating data or change settings. Here are the affected models and what to do now.
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Mitsubishi Electric disclosed that many Wi-Fi-enabled home appliances—air conditioners, refrigerators, water heaters, IH cooktops, rice cookers and more—shipped with a hard-coded password (CVE-2026-5667). Appliances left with Wi-Fi on but never connected to a home router can let a nearby third party read operating data or change settings. Here are the affected models and what to do now.
On June 11, 2026, Mitsubishi Electric disclosed a vulnerability in its Wi-Fi-enabled home appliances. The affected lineup is broad and familiar: room air conditioners, refrigerators, water heaters, IH cooktops, rice cookers, bathroom ventilation/drying units and more. The root cause is that the same credentials were embedded in every product, and the issue is tracked as CVE-2026-5667.
It was also published on June 15 as a domestic advisory, JVNVU#99620284, in Japan's JVN vulnerability database run by IPA and JPCERT/CC. The heart of the problem: every affected model ships with the same fixed network name (SSID) and the same fixed password. When certain conditions line up, a nearby third party can connect to the appliance without even needing to enter a password.
That said, only a specific usage pattern is actually exposed. This is not a reason to rush out and replace your appliances. This article walks general readers through what can happen, how to tell whether your own appliance is affected, and what to do right now.
What can actually happen
In one sentence: a third party within radio range may be able to connect to the appliance without a password and read its operating data or change its settings.
According to Mitsubishi Electric, an attacker moves within range of the Wi-Fi signal the appliance emits, then connects using the fixed SSID and fixed password baked into the product. Once connected, they may steal device data such as the air conditioner's operating state, the set temperature and the room temperature; change air conditioner or Wi-Fi settings; or temporarily knock out Wi-Fi communication (a denial-of-service, or DoS).
There are also clear reasons not to overreact. Mitsubishi Electric explicitly states that these products do not hold personal information such as names or addresses, so the flaw cannot leak personal data. And the attacker is not someone on the far side of the internet—only a person physically close enough for the radio signal to reach. This is not the kind of flaw that lets the other side of the planet target you.
Key facts about this vulnerability
- ▸ID: CVE-2026-5667 (JVNVU#99620284)
- ▸Severity: CVSS v4.0 base score 7.2 (High)
- ▸Root cause: Use of hard-coded credentials (CWE-798)—an ID and password written directly into the product
- ▸Precondition: no password needed, but the attacker must be within the appliance's Wi-Fi range
- ▸Personal data leak: none (the products hold no personal information)
Who would target this, and why
Only someone who can physically get close enough for the appliance's signal to reach can exploit this—not anyone out on the internet. That means a neighbor in the next unit or the floor above or below, someone who can step up to the wall of a house from the road or the lot next door, or a stranger who parks at the curb and lingers—people who can stand right beside the home.
Using the fixed password baked into every affected model, such a person can connect to the appliance without entering any password and read its operating data or rewrite its settings. What they read is not abstract "information" but a concrete pattern: when the air conditioner switches on and off, whether it sits idle while the house is empty—in short, the hours someone is home and the hours they are not.
For a household, having that daily rhythm visible from outside is itself the loss. At-home and away habits are exactly what a burglar wants when casing a place, so collecting them can be the doorway to the next crime. If settings are rewritten, the heating or cooling can be cut in the peak of summer or winter; if the connection is knocked out, you lose remote control from your phone. More than the 7.2 CVSS number suggests, the real harm is that the ordinary assurance—"what happens in our home is known only to us"—quietly erodes without anyone noticing.
Is your appliance affected? Check these 3 states
This is the most important part. Even if you own an affected model, exposure depends on a narrow set of conditions. Mitsubishi Electric says it comes down to which of these three states your appliance is in.
| State of your appliance | Exposure | What to do |
|---|---|---|
| Wi-Fi never used (left disabled) | Not affected | Keep using as is |
| Wi-Fi enabled and connected to your home router | Not affected | Keep using as is (update when a fix ships) |
| Wi-Fi enabled but not connected to a router (left idle / left after reset) | Affected | Action required (below) |
In other words, the risky case is the "in-between" state where Wi-Fi is on but the appliance was never connected to your home router. The appliance keeps emitting its own signal, belonging to no network, so a third party who knows the shared password can connect from the side. This covers cases where you turned Wi-Fi on during setup but never finished pairing it with a router, or reset the device and left it that way.
Conversely, anyone who never used Wi-Fi, or who properly paired the device with a home router through the relevant app (such as Mitsubishi Electric's "MyMU" or "Kirigamine REMOTE," discussed below), is not affected. The first step is simply to find out which state you are in.
Which kinds of appliances are affected
The list runs to hundreds of model numbers, spanning 14 categories of household Wi-Fi products. The main types are below. To confirm whether your specific product is included, check the model-number list in Mitsubishi Electric's official advisory (PDF).
| Product type | Example model numbers |
|---|---|
| Room air conditioners (Kirigamine, etc.) | MSZ-ZW series, MSZ-FZ series, and more |
| Wi-Fi LAN adapters for air conditioners | MAC-900IF, PAC-SK43ML, and more |
| Refrigerators | MR-WXD / MR-MZ / MR-WZ series, and more |
| Heat-pump water heaters / HEMS devices | GT-RA1 / RMCB series, and more |
| Bathroom drying / heating / ventilation units | V-241BZ-RC, WD-240DK-RC, and more |
| Lossnay ventilation / smart ventilation switches | VL-200ZMHSV3-RC, P-04SWRC, and more |
| IH cooktops | RE-322SXR |
| Rice cookers | NJ-AWBX10 |
Some overseas air conditioner models are also listed, but Mitsubishi Electric says these "do not have an interface that can be directly controlled over Wi-Fi," so they cannot lead to data theft, setting changes or DoS—making their impact lighter than the domestic products. Either way, the surest confirmation is by model number.
What to do right now
If the check above put you in the "affected" state (Wi-Fi enabled, not connected to a router), there are two main fixes.
One is to simply connect the appliance to your home Wi-Fi router. Once pairing is complete, the appliance leaves the "in-between" state of broadcasting its own signal, and the vulnerability no longer applies. For connection steps, follow the relevant app and manual: "MyMU" or "Kirigamine REMOTE" for air conditioners, the Mitsubishi refrigerator app for refrigerators, "WiFi Rakuraku Suihan" for rice cookers, and so on.
The other is, if you do not use Wi-Fi at all, to turn the wireless function off. If you have no router or do not plan to use phone integration, disabling the wireless feature per the product manual (called "external connection" on water heaters, "communication settings" on rice cookers, etc.) avoids the issue on its own.
On top of that, the company is rolling out fixes (adapter software updates) in stages. Many air conditioners and adapters are already fixed in version 43.00 or later, updatable from the app. For some products the fix is still upcoming, and for a few there is no plan to release one. The main schedule is below.
| Product | Fixed version | Release timing |
|---|---|---|
| Air conditioners / adapters (many domestic models) | Ver 43.00 or later | Available now |
| IH cooktops / rice cookers | Ver 01.90 / 01.91 or later | June 29–30, 2026 |
| Refrigerators / bath units / Lossnay / ventilation switches | Per model | July 6–17, 2026 |
| Air conditioners (overseas) / some adapters | Ver 52.00 or later | December 2026 (planned) |
| Water heaters / HEMS devices | Planned (none for HEMS use) | TBD |
| Some older models (e.g. MAC-884IF) | No fix planned | — |
For products with no planned fix, or while you wait for one, you can avoid exposure by either connecting to a router or disabling the wireless function. Mitsubishi Electric also recommends basic router-side measures: use a hard-to-guess password, set encryption to WPA2-PSK (AES) or similar, and place the router where outsiders cannot touch it. These help protect your whole home network, not just these appliances.
The technical view: why it happened
The cause is that a fixed network name (SSID) and a fixed password were written directly into the product. Technically this is "use of hard-coded credentials (CWE-798)"—a classic weakness that recurs in embedded devices. Baking the same secret into every unit at the factory makes manufacturing and setup easier, but once that secret is known, every unit of the same product opens with the same key.
The severity is rated CVSS v4.0 7.2. It does not reach the top 9-point band because the attacker is limited to close radio range, and the impact stays mostly at data snooping, setting changes and communication disruption rather than leaking personal data or physically taking over the device. The flaw was reported by Bulgarian security researcher Zachary Mitev, and Mitsubishi Electric credits him via its PSIRT (product security team).
Mitsubishi Electric's Wi-Fi appliances had another issue disclosed not long ago: CVE-2025-49604, where a third party on the same Wi-Fi could temporarily block remote control. That earlier flaw only let an attacker disrupt control; this one extends to snooping on data and changing settings, broadening the impact. Overseas, Mitsubishi Electric's commercial air conditioning systems have also had an authentication-bypass flaw patched, a sign that the network features of appliances keep drawing attacker attention.
Summary
This vulnerability in Mitsubishi Electric's Wi-Fi appliances stems from a simple design problem: the same password was embedded in every unit. It does not directly threaten life or property, and there is no risk of personal data leaking. But on appliances that have Wi-Fi enabled yet were never connected to a home router, a nearby third party may read your daily routine or switch your heating and cooling off.
What you need to do is not hard. First, determine whether your appliance is "Wi-Fi disabled," "connected to a router," or "enabled but not connected." If it is unconnected, pair it with your home router; if you do not use Wi-Fi, turn the wireless function off. Then update from the app once a fix ships. That is enough to avoid exposure. Even for the network features you usually ignore, checking the settings once brings peace of mind. The latest status is available on Mitsubishi Electric's vulnerability information page.
Sources
- ▸ Mitsubishi Electric - Information Disclosure, Tampering/Deletion/Destruction and DoS Vulnerability in Multiple Home Appliances (2026-001) (June 11, 2026)
- ▸ JVN - JVNVU#99620284 Use of Hard-coded Credentials in Multiple Mitsubishi Electric Home Appliances (June 15, 2026)
- ▸ NVD - CVE-2026-5667
- ▸ Mitsubishi Electric - Vulnerability Information (Product Security)
- ▸ CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials
- ▸ Related - Mitsubishi Electric appliances vulnerability CVE-2025-49604

Makoto Horikawa
Backend Engineer / AWS / Django